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ESSAY
LIES AND LAW
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
The controversy over the impeachment of President Clinton
holds an especially morbid fascination for lawyers. After all, a
persistent theme in that controversy has been whether
statements that result from "thinking like a lawyer" are
meaningfully different from lies. For instance, the President's
famously creative use of the words "is," "alone," and "sexual
relations" -first in his deposition in the Paula Jones lawsuit,
then before a federal grand jury, and again in his answers to
eighty-one interrogatories asked of him by the House Judiciary
Committee-was represented by his defenders to be "legally
correct" but was derided by his critics as "legalism," "legal
hairsplitting," or "legalese."I Thus, the accusation of perjury
against President Clinton raises the intriguing but distressing
question of whether an individual who claims to be speaking
like a lawyer ought to be understood to be lying. That, in turn,
raises the more general question whether and to what extent
legal arguments are lies.
Before pursuing these questions, it should be emphasized
that President Clinton's statements are lawyer-like, not the
statements of a lawyer. To be a lawyer is by definition to take
on a set of professional roles; the conventions of legal
argumentation all have their meaning and justification only in
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. A version of this paper was delivered at the Sixth Annual Ira C.
Rothgerber, Jr., Conference at the University of Colorado School of Law on November
6,1998.
1. See generally James Bennet, Packaging This President As Sinner but Not Perjurer, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept 15, 1998, at A22; Alison Mitchell, Top Democrats Call for Speedy Decisions
and Warn Clinton Against Splitting Hairs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 15, 1998, at A24; John M.
Broder, Clinton Responds to Hyde's Queries; Yields No Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,1998,
at Al; Eric Schmitt, G.O.P. Vote Counter in House Predicts Impeachment of Clinton, NEW
YORK TIMES, Nov. 30,1998, at A19; Alison Mitchell & Lizette Alvarez, Republicans Tell
Leaders to Aim for Quick Vote on Impeachment, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3,1998, at Al.
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the context of these roles. Therefore, while a person can have
various characteristics that are similar to the characteristics
exhibited by people acting in legal roles, strictly speaking one
cannot have a lawyer's personality or mind outside of those
roles. So to the extent that President Clinton's defense to the
charge of perury is, "I have a lawyer's mind and must be
understood to have intended legalistic meanings," the precise
question he confronts us with is this: Are legalistic meanings,
when used outside of the lawyer's professional roles,
descriptively different from lies?
Because there are many kinds of legalisms, there can be no
simple answer to this question. It is dear that legal thinking
and legal argumentation are not always or necessarily
dishonest, but one identifiable and important form of legal
argument does seem descriptively to overlap significantly with
lying. Due to my suspicion about where President Clinton was
introduced to this form of legal thinking, I will call it the "Yale
Argument."2 By using this phrase, I do not mean that this kind
of argument is of recent derivation or that it is used only or
primarily at the Yale Law School. I do mean that it has a high
pedigree and that many important institutions celebrate and
promote it.
The most characteristic, and perhaps the most basic, element
of the Yale Argument is the manipulation of levels of
abstraction. For example, in one of this century's most
significant line of cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said
that the specific liberties protected by the Constitution, such as
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
imply a more general liberty-the right to privacy.3 And then,
by degrees, the Court has expanded this right to privacy so that
it now protects the even more general right of personal
autonomy-indeed, as the Court phrased it in Casey, the right
"to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe ... .. 4 Abstraction taken to this extent strikes many
people as absurd, and, even when used less extravagantly, the
2. I was educated there, too, at about the same time.
3. For an interesting argument that the key case in this line is Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
US. 438 (1972), see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADMON OF AMEmCAN
CONSTTUrrONALISM A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 174-79 (1993).
4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
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underlying intellectual argument can be seen as a kind of trick.
Nevertheless, the central contribution of our most prominent
legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, is his elaboration of the
argument that defining rights at high levels of abstraction is an
essential aspect of a coherent constitutional philosophy.5 This
lofty claim notwithstanding, we see a strikingly sinilar impulse
at work in President Clinton's lowly prevarications. He
proclaimed with a straight face that a person might be thought
not to be "alone," you may recall, if the relevant boundary line
is expanded beyond the room he occupies to include his office
or, beyond that, his suite of offices or, beyond that, a whole
wing of the White House. Why not, inspired by the Court's
poetic invocation of the most general interest in defining one's
place in the universe, move the line out to include the entire
heavily-populated East Coast or, indeed, this crowded planet
itself?
I grant that the apparent similarity between the most
influential intellectual move of modem constitutional law and
President Clinton's laughable dodge may be only superficial.
But functionally, the use of high levels of abstraction in
constitutional interpretation operates to accomplish what
Clinton was trying to do, which was to assign a surprising or
counterintuitive meaning to an ordinary word. In all its various
forms this is a pervasive aim of the Yale Argument. Thus, for
example, some years ago the Supreme Court decreed that
patronage systems violate the free speech clause.6 It declared
that to replace a public employee because of that person's
political affiliation is to "penalize" political belief.7 This
understanding of "penalize" was, at the time, startling in part
simply because of the inertial weight of common practice. That
is, patronage had been used around the country for hundreds
of years and had been regarded as a normal aspect of political
accountability rather than a punishment. There never was, of
course, anything logically necessary about this view of
patronage. It had always been possible, as the Court eventually
decided to do, to view patronage from a different and
5. This has, of course, been a pervasive theme in Dworldn's work; it appears fairly
recently in LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 118-47 (1994).
6. See Elrodv. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
7. See id. at 359.
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imaginative angle-that is, to emphasize the loss to the
individual dismissed, rather than the gain in accountability to
the political system from the new person hired. When the
Court shifted our perception of the word "penalty," it plainly
was using language in a highly creative way, but because this
kind of creativity has become so basic to modem constitutional
interpretation, it is taken for granted. Lawyers, especially, think
there is nothing odd about calling acts like burning a flag or
spending money "speech," and when someone notices the
unusual way words are being used in constitutional law-as
when Justice White characterized as facetious the argument
that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is "deeply
rooted" in American history 8-many sophisticated people react
with indignation.
Needless to say, there is nothing necessarily wrong or
unjustifiable in jurists' creative use of language. Our most
eminent judges and academics are respected because they have
done so. Consider Chief Justice Marshall's brilliant argument,
advanced in McCulloch v. Maryland,9 for construing the words
"necessary and proper" as "convenient."10 Or consider virtually
any constitutional argument made by Ronald Dworkin or
Laurence Tribe." But, as the incredulous public reaction to
Clinton's creative interpretations of words like "alone" and
"sexual relations" illustrates, it is one thing that liars also do.
Because the objective of the Yale Argument is to establish a
meaning that is different from the ordinary, customary
meaning of a word, it typically disparages existing perceptions
and understandings. A soft form of this disparagement is to
minimize the weight of the historical practices that shape those
8. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy).
9. 17 US. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
10. See 1d. at 413-14, discussed as an obliteration of text in Robert F. Nagel, The
Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165,185-86 (1985).
11. In a typical passage, for instance, Dworkin asserts that "read in the most natural
way, the words of the Bill or Rights... command nothing less than that government
treat everyone subject to its dominion with equal concern and respect .... " DwORKIN,
supra note 5, at 128. Tribe once went so far as to argue that the Tenth Amendment
should be understood as requiring a right to some level of government services. See
Laurence II Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977). Both
editions of his treatise, AMERICAN CONSTumTIONAL LAW (1978,1988) are fully stocked
with imaginative, surprising interpretations.
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understandings. Thus in the patronage case, the Court
mentioned the long history of patronage in the United States
but insisted that the recent "strong decline" in its use was of
greater significance.' 2 Similar historical arguments have been
made in efforts to establish that abortion and unmarried
parenthood are traditionally protected rights. 3 Perhaps the
most extreme form of disparagement is to deny that anyone
does or could use the contested word in its ordinary or
customary sense. In McCulloch, for instance, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that a literal meaning for the phrase "necessary
and proper" would have been "an extraordinary departure
from the usual course of the human mind."'14 Similarly,
Dworkin argues that members of the pro-life movement do not
actually understand their own moral position on abortion and
mean something different from what they say on that issue.'5
Indeed, Dworkin goes so far as to claim that the thoughts that
pro-lifers think they have actually do not exist and that,
therefore, it would be "uncharitable" to think they mean what
they say.' 6 President Clinton, then, was following a proud
argumentative tradition when he went so far as to claim that
the grand jurors to whom he was speaking would probably
understand "sexual relations" to exclude oral sexual behavior
and, indeed, that most ordinary Americans would.
Disparagement or denial of existing understandings is not
always part of a lie, but it can plainly serve the purposes of a
liar because it undermines the standard in relation to which the
deception can be identified.
The radical alteration of existing practices and
understandings, which is the purpose of the Yale Argument, is
a difficult task. The Argument, therefore, is characterized by
an array of opportunistic claims to authority. If evidence of
12. Elrod, 427 US. at 354. Although the Court at one point denied that the decline of
patronage was relevant to the question of constitutionality, it quickly added that "the
actual operation of a practice viewed in retrospect may help to assess its workings with
respect to constitutional limitations." Id. Later in the opinion, the Court relied on the
growth of merit systems to support its conclusion that patronage was not the least
drastic means for achieving political accountability or protecting political parties. See
d. at 366, 369.
13. See Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 129,140 (1972) (abortion); Michael R. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110,141-49 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (unmarried parenthood).
14. McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) at 419.
15. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at xi.
16. Seei.
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historical intent can be mustered for the desired outcome, the
mythical status of the "Founding Fathers" will be invoked; if
that evidence is missing or if it points in the wrong direction,
the appeal will shift, perhaps to the need to keep the
Constitution "up-to-date." Or, if it will help the cause, specific
text will be emphasized, but if the precise language works
against the argument, the interpreter will point instead to the
general "structure" of the document. If all else fails, the very
pretense of persuasion and justification will be dropped, and
the authority relied on will be a bald claim of hierarchical
status. When asked in Casey to overrule Roe v. Wade, a majority
of the justices of the Supreme Court said, in essence, "We are
the highest court in the land and we have already spoken on
the issue of abortion and that is the end of the matter. 17
No matter what the specific form of justification, in the Yale
Argument there is almost always an implicit claim of superior
effort, skill, or intelligence. In his effort to re-frame the Catholic
position on abortion, Ronald Dworkin presents himself as
having thought harder than the Pope about Catholic theology. 8
Indeed, the underlying aesthetic of constitutional
interpretation, as expressed in both judicial decisions and
academic commentary, is largely a claim of "authority-from-
effort." Hence, opinions as well as articles sink under the
weight of detailed footnotes, of laborious argumentation, and
of exhaustive recitation of precedent.19 The Yale Argument
turns the surprising newness of its understandings into an
asset by equating originality with intellectual effort and
sophistication, and by dismissing older beliefs as un-thought-
out or outmoded.20 In constitutional decisions, traditional
moral views are frequently dismissed as "irrational" and
historical patterns of behavior as unproven.21 In the end, the
authority of the Yale Argument rests on unceasing verbal
energy. Although only mute history stands behind the
17. Needless to say, the Courts discussion of stare decisis is actually considerably
more elaborate than this, but the foot-stamping insistence on authority is unmistakable.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 867-68
(1992).
18. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 39-50.
19. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 177-82
20. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CoNSTrrtToNAL CULTURES: THE MENTALrY AND
CONSEQUENCES OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 114-18 (1989).
21. See id.
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unjustified practices of the past, the new terminology is backed
by a virtual torrent of words. Like President Clinton's
protestations before the grand jury-his claims of careful
thought, his garrulous explanations, and his earnest posture of
helpfulness-the stance behind the Yale Argument is by turns
studious, solicitous, arrogant, and authoritarian. Like the "lies"
in Clinton's testimony, the Yale Argument desperately utilizes
whatever works.
The Yale Argument proceeds from the best of motivations. It
begins with the desire to improve the world. But as the political
scientist Rogers Smith and others have pointed out, in order to
mandate progress in the name of law, especially in the name of
constitutional law, it is necessary to deceive.22 Where the law is
backward, it must be made to seem progressive. Where the law
is uncertain or permissive, it must be made to seem definite
and mandatory. Where arguments are limited and honestly
debatable, they must be made to seem comprehensive and
inescapable. Where opponents refuse to yield, their positions
must be distorted or they themselves must be belittled and
insulted. Similarly, President Clinton felt that his
unconventional use of language before the grand jury was
benignly motivated; indeed, he felt this so keenly that his
testimony, like constitutional argumentation, took on a self-
righteous cast. He regarded the objectives and tactics of the
Paula Jones lawsuit as "deplorable." In fact, by describing that
lawsuit as a political attack, President Clinton signaled his
perception of that suit as a threat to the progressive policies
that might result from his presidency. Lies, as Sissela Bok
points out, are very frequently motivated by the desire to
reform the world, at least according to the liar's lights23 The
need to manipulate arises in response to obstacles, which are
likely to seem outrageous in proportion to the reformer's moral
self-assurance, that are preventing progress.
The Yale Argument has, as its name suggests, high prestige.
It is portrayed as an intellectual discipline. Its foremost
22. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A
Diagnosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert
Adams eds.) (Nomos No. 40,1998). For a defense of duplicity, see Scott Altman, Beyond
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990).
23. See SssEtA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRiVATE LIFE 50, 80-81,
166 (1978).
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practitioners are not only respected but admired as heroes. It
has inspired almost religious devotion. 24 And it has been used
successfully to establish hugely ambitious and controversial
plans of social reform. It is, in fact, so much an accepted part of
our political heritage that its descriptive similarity to lying is
almost always overlooked or explained away. But at its core,
President Clinton's testimony was essentially a Yale Argument,
and neither his argument nor the fancy constitutional
interpretations that it so resembles can be meaningfully
distinguished from lies.
To the extent that the Yale Argument is similar to lying,
American dependence on-even reverence for-constitutional
argumentation is surely curious. Before speculating on what
this susceptibility might mean, I should address two objections.
First, although a liar claims what is false to be true, it might be
said that the Yale Argument claims only what may be true to
be true. The Yale Argument, under this view, urges one
possible view of reality. A patronage dismissal can be viewed
as a penalty, if you focus on the individual's interest rather
than society's interest, and the right to abortion can be viewed
as an aspect of the traditional American liberty of privacy, if
you are convinced that a broader principle was inchoate in
specific past practices. There is no denying that truth in law is
hard to discover and controversial, but so it is in science and
everyday life. We still are able to identify lies. One ordinary
way to do so is to distinguish the person who, while actually
appealing to a new or specialized meaning of a word,
nevertheless falsely says, "I know how you understand my
words and I am appealing to that established meaning." It was a
deception, I think, for judges to say that abortion has been a
part of our "fundamental traditions" knowing that many
citizens would understand those words in the normal sense,2 5
just as it was false for President Clinton to say that he was
24. See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583
(199).
25. The persistence of this deception is only emphasized by the CourVs recent effort
to distinguish assisted suicide from abortion. In Washington v. Glucksberg, a majority of
the Justices, after insisting that its interpretive method in due process cases required a
careful and specific description of the protected liberty, depicted the right to abortion
as having been derived from "those personal activities and decisions that this Court has
identified as deeply rooted in our history and traditions .... " Washington v.
Glucksber& 117 S. Ct. 2258,2268-71 (1997).
[Vol. 22
Lies and Law
never "alone" with Monica Lewinsky knowing that the grand
jurors would understand that word in its normal sense.
A second and related objection arises from the fact that a lie
is a message meant to make others believe what the liar asserts
but does not believe. A lawyer making a Yale Argument, or a
lawyer-like Bill Clinton testifying under oath, might be thought
not to be lying because he believes the truth of his claims. In his
grand jury testimony, Clinton appealed to this idea when he
speculated that both Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill "thought
they were telling the truth."26 People relying on this defense
might have deluded themselves into their beliefs -either out of
a fervent desire to improve the world, out of self-interest, or
some combination-but in neither situation would the speaker
be claiming what he does not believe to be true. At worst, one
might say that the speaker is making an argument that might
well be false but that the speaker has talked himself into
believing. At best, esoteric considerations-perhaps alluded to
by President Clinton when he called this "the most mysterious
area of human life"27-might suggest that belief somehow
creates reality or is the only reality.
Here the similarity between President Clinton and lawyers
engaged in the Yale Argument is eerie. It is common to read
incredulous speculations about whether Clinton, our first post-
modem president, might at least momentarily believe
everything he says.28 In the same way, law professors often
wonder in private whether it is possible that highly intelligent
people like Tribe and Dworkin, ignoring how unlikely it is that
their political preferences should so often coincide with a
correct understanding of the Constitution, might actually
believe their own arguments. In both cases sincere belief seems
both possible and impossible at the same time-possible
because of the relentless earnestness of the speakers but
impossible because of the evident speciousness of their stories.
Let us assume that the mind can be convinced of almost
anything if incentives are strong enough and that in both
President Clinton and Professor Dworkin there is true belief.
26. The President's Testimony: Part Six ofEight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,1998, at B6.
27. Id.
28. That is, as a consequence of confusing belief with reality. See, e.g., Marshall
Blonsky & Edmundo Desnoes, The Relativist-in-Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 29,1998, at A25;
George Will, Sony Only for Getting Caught, CHL SUN-TIMES, Sept. 19,1998, at 19.
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Under this assumption, the difference alluded to earlier
between being a lawyer-like person and a lawyer in a
professional role is important. Part of the professional
discipline required by the lawyer's role is the capacity to
compartmentalize self-delusion. Thus, the fervent advocate
may well feel during oral argument that his claims are true. But
this is understood to be a momentary consequence of doing the
job, and after dinner and a drink the lawyer can acknowledge
privately his personal belief that his argument was weak or
wrong. Society not only forgives but encourages this capacity
for temporary self-delusion because of the presumed benefits
of strong advocacy. Society even tolerates the obnoxious
lawyer who loses the capacity for compartmentalization and
always, even after dinner, believes his clients are in the right. It
also, I might add, tolerates and even lionizes the authoritarian
judge who actually believes that his highly imaginative
interpretations of the Constitution are true. Both the endlessly
argumentative lawyer and the hopelessly self-assured judge
are, like the frenzied oral advocate, in a sense depleted
individuals because their roles have consumed them. But this
depletion is considered part of the price of a complicated and
ambitious legal system. A person not filling the socially
sanctioned role of lawyer or judge, however, is not necessarily
forgiven a lie just because of self-delusion. Here, as Bok points
out,2 9 there are many shades of gray, but in ordinary relations
we recognize that, at some point along the scale of objective
improbability, a liar's convenient sense of conviction does not
excuse the lie.
If I am right, then, that as a descriptive matter the Yale
Argument and President Clinton's deceptions cannot be
meaningfully distinguished, lying is far more a part of the high
political practice of constitutional interpretation than we
usually admit. Why do Americans tolerate this when they
usually condemn lying in ordinary interactions? President
Clinton, I think, is instructive on this question. He vividly
demonstrates that lying has its charms. The very obviousness
of President Clinton's lies invites a willing suspension of
disbelief so that, if we but accede to a creative reformulation of
language, reality can be altered and improved. President
29. See BOK, supra note 23, at 15-16.
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Clinton, an impressive and attractive leader, need not be a
felon and his presidency need not end in tatters. All that is
necessary to avoid these dire possibilities is for us to put aside
what we know words to mean and to enter into the liar's
world. In short, lying is magical and liberating.
In this, lying tracks some fundamental and likable American
traits. Americans tend to think that any problem can be solved
and that progress is always possible. When these happy
assumptions collide with facts, the temptation is great to
reform the world by reforming language.3 0 - Through
constitutional interpretation, that is, we fabricate a history, a
people, and a nation that do not really exist.3' Those who
cannot convince enough of their fellow citizens that patronage
is a bad practice tell us that enforcing political qualifications for
public jobs is akin to imprisoning an editorial writer. Those
who believe that abortion should be freely available need only
persuade the judiciary to tell us that this right has already long
been a part of our fundamental liberties. Indeed, well-
intentioned but frustrated citizens can accomplish much in this
way. To protect the country from those people perceived to be
fanatical, intolerant, or prejudiced, all the enlightened need do
is reform words. The purpose of such lies is to bend others to
the liar's will by distorting language, and the easiest marks are
those who want deeply to believe that good things are always
possible.
While American optimism makes us susceptible to certain
high forms of lying, it is also true that American
contentiousness and competitiveness encourage an
appreciation for all the everyday forms of deception that are
endemic to the adversary system. It is not too much to say that
we have a legal system that from top to bottom is built in
significant part on half-truths, exaggerations, distortions,
omissions, and falsehoods.3 2 Americans know this and scorn
lawyers because of it, but Americans also depend heavily on
30. For an arresting account of how boundless expectations produce an appetite for
deception, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN
AMERICA 4-5, 37,76,118,260 (Vintage Books 1992) (1987).
31. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDiCIAL PowER AND AmERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING
OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 151 (1994).
32. For an insightful account focusing on criminal law, see WILLIAM T. PizzI, TRIALS
WITHOUT TRUST: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE
FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (1999).
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this system and admire those who function effectively within
it.
Quite aside from the subject matter of his lies, it is no
wonder, then, that there was widespread reluctance to impeach
and remove President Clinton for testifying in a lawyer-like
way.33 How can such testimony be viewed as a serious threat to
the constitutional system when the constitutional
interpretations that authoritatively define that system are
themselves built on very similar, if fander, deceptions and
when the legal apparatus that is such an important part of that
system organizes and regularizes deception on a massive scale?
Or, to put the point more concretely, the televised version of
President Clinton's grand jury testimony conveyed not the
dangerous image of a potential tyrant, but the familiar and
unthreatening impression of a dogged and inventive advocate
arguing a difficult case.
This impression, however, may be misleading. In fact,
President Clinton's lies can be viewed as threatening to the
system precisely because the system relies so heavily on
legalistic deceptions. As Bok, not to mention nearly every
parent, emphasizes, lying tends to lead to more lying34 This is,
of course, partly because of the internal dynamics of deception,
but it is also partly because of the external dynamics-that is,
the breakdown of social inhibitions and taboos. American
reliance on deception in constitutional interpretation and in the
legal system more broadly is, therefore, highly dangerous.
Legal lying is cabined, to the extent that it is, by some rather
thin lines. One of these is the distinction between the lawyer's
role and authentic personality. To the extent that our society
blurs that distinction, we will have to pay the price of being
governed by individuals like President Clinton who make an
undifferentiated claim to the high prerogatives of the Yale
Argument and also to the low prerogatives of the adversarial
lawyer, and who claim these prerogatives in personal relations,
33. Polls taken after the broadcast of President Clinton's grand jury testimony
indicate that most people did not see his use of language as normal or convincing but
did not seem to think much the worse of him as a consequence. See, e.g., Marjorie
Connelly, Clinton Holds Mostly Steady in the Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 23,1998, at A24. It is
possi'ble to see 'legal hair-splitting" as an acceptable form of lying, just as it is
commonplace to regard lawyers as socially useful even if they are paid to deceive.
34. See BoK supra note 23, at 25, 52,119-21,173-74.
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as sworn witnesses in civil and criminal cases, and in general
political discourse. I myself have serious doubts about how safe
it is for our form of government to rely so heavily on a legal
system that operates on the basis of heavy-handed tactics of
verbal manipulation. Be that as it may, it is no small matter to
watch those tactics break out of the legal arena and infect the
office of the presidency and, indeed, the culture more
generally. From this perspective the impeachment decision
should be viewed as having been not only a judgment directed
against an officeholder but also an effort to construct a barrier
against our own weaknesses.

